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A mean-field game economic growth model
Diogo Gomes1, Laurent Lafleche2, and Levon Nurbekyan3
Abstract— Here, we examine a mean-field game (MFG) that
models the economic growth of a population of non-cooperative
rational agents. In this MFG, agents are described by two
state variables - the capital and consumer goods they own.
Each agent seeks to maximize their utility by taking into
account statistical data of the total population. The individual
actions drive the evolution of the players, and a market-
clearing condition determines the relative price of capital and
consumer goods. We study the existence and uniqueness of
optimal strategies of the agents and develop numerical methods
to compute these strategies and the equilibrium price.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mathematical methods are central to modern economic
theory and while the behavior of economic agents cannot
always be reduced to a precise mathematical formulation,
utility maximization principles and game-theoretical equilib-
ria explain many important phenomena. This is particularly
relevant in problems where the hypothesis of rational expec-
tations holds [32].
In numerous instances, the behavior of economic agents
cannot be adequately captured by the representative agent
assumption. Heterogeneous agent models allow the study
of questions where the differences between agents are of
primary relevance, see [5], [3], or [20].
Mean-field games (MFG) were introduced in the engi-
neering community in [19], [18], and in the mathematical
community in [21], [22], [23] to model problems with a large
number of agents acting non-cooperatively. Applications in
economics and sustainable growth were some of earlier the
motivations for these problems [24], [25]. While a substantial
part of recent research on MFG has focused on mathematical
questions [31], [13], [12], [9], [11], [17], [14], [8], a number
of emergent applications have been identified, including
machine learning [29], [30], price formation [7], [6], energy
systems [26], [4], and socio-economic applications [27],
[16], [15]. In economics, MFG provide a solid mathematical
framework to investigate economic problems with heteroge-
neous agents [33], [1], [2], [28].
In [10], the authors present a mean-field game model
for economic growth in a population of rational agents.
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In this model, agents can produce and trade capital and
consumer goods and seek to maximize a utility function. An
equilibrium condition determines the single macroeconomic
variable, the price of capital goods measured in consumer
goods. From the mathematical point of view, little is known
about this model. Here, we study the existence, uniqueness
and number of other qualitative and quantitative properties
of optimal strategies of agents. We also develop numerical
methods to calculate these optimal strategies and the equi-
librium price.
We close this introduction with a brief outline of the paper.
We begin by developing the model in Section II. Next, in
Section III, we investigate the optimal actions of the agents.
A particular case with N agents is examined in Section IV.
This N player problem is then used to develop a numerical
scheme, whose implementation as well as some results are
presented in Section V. The paper ends, in Section VI, with
a short discussion on open problems and future research
directions.
II. THE MODEL
The growth model we consider here was introduced in
[10]. This model features wealth (in the form of consumer
goods) and capital accumulation with a capital-dependent
production function.
A. Microeconomic framework
At the time t, each agent has an amount kt of capital and at
of consumer goods. Agents select a consumption rate ct and
an investment rate et . The investment is made by exchanging
consumer goods for capital goods. This exchange is made
through a clearing mechanism at a price pt determined by the
market. More precisely, agents exchange ptet of consumer
goods by an amount et of capital goods.
Agents use capital to produce either consumer goods or
additional capital. The production is specified by two pro-
duction functions that depend on the price level and capital.
The production function for consumer goods is Θ(k, p) and
the production function for capital goods is Ξ(k, p). Finally,
our model also takes into account the possibility of capital
depreciation through a function g(k, p).
All the previous factors are assembled in the following
microeconomic dynamics for a single agent:{
a˙t =−ct −ptet +Θ(kt ,pt)
k˙t = g(kt ,pt)+ et +Ξ(kt ,pt).
(1)
In alternative, we can regard the investment it = et +Ξ(kt ,pt)
as the control variable. Then, we define the global production
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function as F(k, p) := Θ(kt ,pt) + ptΞ(kt ,pt). Accordingly,
(1) becomes {
a˙t =−ct −pt it +F(kt ,pt)
k˙t = it +g(kt ,pt).
(2)
Each agent has preferences on the value of his con-
sumption, investment, consumer goods and capital. These
preferences are encoded in a utility function u(a,k,c, i). We
assume that u is increasing and concave. The goal of each
agent is to maximize his utility during a time horizon T for
a given initial amount of goods a0 = a0 and capital k0 = k0.
We define the utility or value function as
V (a0,k0, t) := sup
(c,i)∈C×I
∫ T
t
u(as,ks,cs, is)ds, (3)
where C and I are the functional spaces on (0,T ) where
the controls i and c are selected.
The Hamiltonian associated with the dynamics (2) and the
optimization problem (3) is
H(a,k,qa,qk, p) := (4)
sup
(c,i)∈R2
((−c− pi+F(k, p))qa+(i+g(k, p))qk +u(a,k,c, i)).
(5)
If the value function V in (3) is continuously differentiable,
then it solves the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
∂tV (a,k, t)+H(a,k,∂aV (a,k, t),∂kV (a,k, t),pt) = 0, (6)
with V (a,k,T ) = 0. Moreover, any twice continuously dif-
ferentiable solution of the previous equation is the value
function.
Finally, given a twice continuously differentiable solution
of (6), the optimal controls c∗t (a,k) and i∗t (a,k) are deter-
mined in feedback form through the equations{
∂qaH(a,k,∂aV,∂kV,pt) =−c∗t −pt i∗t +F(k,pt)
∂qk H(a,k,∂aV,∂kV,pt) = i
∗
t +g(k,pt).
(7)
B. Macroeconomic setting
On the macroeconomic scale, agents are described by a
probability density ρ; for each time t ∈ [0,T ], ρt(a,k) is the
probability density of agents with an amount a of consumer
goods and k of capital. Consequently,∫
R2
ρt(a,k)dadk = 1, for t ∈ [0,T ].
We assume all agents are rational. So, the dynamics of each
individual is given by{
a˙t = ∂qaH(at ,kt ,∂aV (at ,kt , t),∂kV (at ,kt , t),pt)
k˙t = ∂qk H(at ,kt ,∂aV (at ,kt , t),∂kV (at ,kt , t),pt).
Accordingly, the density of players solves the transport
equation
∂tρ+∂a(∂qaHρ)+∂k(∂qk Hρ) = 0. (8)
C. Mean-field game formulation of the problem
As the agents can only exchange consumer goods and
capital with other agents, we have a balance equation∫
R2
e∗t (a,k)ρ(a,k, t)dadk = 0,
for 0≤ t ≤ T . Equivalently,∫
R2
i∗t (a,k)ρt(a,k)dadk =
∫
R2
Ξ(k,pt)ρt(a,k)dadk. (9)
The previous balance condition, the Hamilton-Jacobi equa-
tion (6), and the transport equation (8) determine a mean-
field game formulation of the problem{
∂tV +H(a,k,∂aV,∂kV,pt) = 0
∂tρ+∂a(∂qaHρ)+∂k(∂qk Hρ) = 0
(10)
with
V (a,k,T ) = 0, ρ(a,k,0) = ρ0(a,k)
for some ρ0(a,k). The coupling between these two equations
follows from the equilibrium equation (9) that determines pt .
III. EXISTENCE OF OPTIMAL TRAJECTORIES
In this section, we discuss assumptions that ensure that
problem (3) is well posed. We are interested in the existence
and uniqueness of optimal trajectories and controls under a
given price dynamics. If the utility function u is concave, and
the controls c and i are bounded, then (3) admits a maximizer
(see [10]). Here, we do not assume a priori that the controls
are bounded. Instead, we impose natural growth constraints
on the utility function u and prove the existence of optimal
trajectories and controls.
In our analysis, in contrast to classical optimal control
theory problems, the utility function u is not coercive. Hence,
a central technical point that we need to address is the
boundedness of the controls in the interval (0,T ).
The uniqueness of optimal trajectories for strictly concave
utility functions was proven in [10].
A. Main assumptions
Our main assumptions are as follows.
Assumption 3.1 (g is sub-linear): There exists (g1,g2) ∈
L ∞loc(R)2 such that
g(k, p)≤ g1(p)k+g2(p),
for all (k, p) ∈ R2.
The previous assumption includes, for instance the impor-
tant case of a linear depreciation function g(k, p) =−βk, for
some β > 0.
Assumption 3.2 (F is sub-linear): There exists (F1,F2) ∈
L ∞loc(R)2 such that
F(k, p)≤ F1(p)k+F2(p),
for all (k, p) ∈ R2.
Before stating the next assumption, we recall that for x ∈
R, x+ = max{x,0}, and x− = max{−x,0}.
Assumption 3.3: There exists (γ j) j∈{1,4} ∈ [0,1]4,
(α j) j∈{1,4} ∈ [1,+∞[4 and Cu ∈ R∗+ such that
u(a,k,c, i)≤Cu(1+(c+)γ1 +(a+)γ3 +(k+)γ4
− (c−)α1 −|i|α2 − (a−)α3 − (k−)α4),
for all (c, i,a,k) ∈ R4.
Definition 3.1: Let A,B and C be normed vector spaces,
Ω× I ⊂ A× B be open subsets. F : Ω× I → C is locally
uniformly integrable in the second variable if for all
(x0, t0) ∈ Ω× I there exists X × J neighborhood of (x0, t0)
so that (
t 7→ sup
x∈X
|F(x, t)|
)
∈ L1(J).
B. Existence of Solutions
Finally, we state our main result on the existence of
solutions.
Theorem 3.1: Let L1R,loc := {c ∈ L1loc ([0,T )) ,
∫ T
0 c
+ ≤ R}.
Assume u∈C1(R4) is concave, verifies Assumption 3.3, and
that there exists C ∈ R+ such that∣∣∣∣ ∂u∂xi (x1, ...x4)
∣∣∣∣≤C
(
1+
4
∑
j=1
|x j|α j
)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. Moreover, suppose that p is bounded in
(0,T ), F and g are sub-linear (Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2)
and such that
• ∀k ∈ R, g(k, ·) ∈L ∞loc(R),
• ∀k ∈ R, F(k, ·) ∈L ∞loc(R),
• (k, t) 7→ F(k,pt) is locally uniformly integrable in the
second variable.
Let P := ‖p‖L∞(0,T ) and R ∈ R be such that R ≥
P‖g(k0, ·)‖L ∞(−P,P)+ ‖F(k0, ·)‖L ∞(−P,P). Then, for a given
initial quantity (a0,k0) ∈R2 of consumer goods and capital,
there exists a maximizer to (3) with C = L1R,loc and I = L
1
loc.
Remark 3.1: If, for each p, the functions k 7→ F(k, p) and
k 7→ g(k, p) are concave, the hypotheses of Theorem 3.1 hold,
and we obtain the existence of optimal trajectories.
Proof: We sketch here the proof of the theorem that is
based on the direct method in the calculus of variations. We
select a minimizing sequence (akt ,kkt ,ckt , ikt ). Assumption 3.3
ensures the boundedness of this sequence. Therefore, we can
extract a weakly convergent subsequence. Next, Assumptions
3.1 and 3.2 give that the limit is a admissible trajectory for
(2). Finally, the concavity of u implies that this trajectory is
a minimizer by weak upper semicontinuity of (3).
IV. N-PLAYER APPROXIMATION
In this section, we construct a N-player approximation of
our growth model. We assume that the population in our
model consists of a fixed number of players N ∈N and obtain
a system of equations for the optimal trajectories.
Let ant ,knt be the amount of consumer goods and capital of
the player n at time t, for 1≤ n≤N. We select an individual
agent. As shown in the previous section, given a price
dynamics pt , we can always find an optimal strategy for this
player. In the finite player case, we assume arbitrary initial
wealth in consumer goods and capital for the N players.
Then, using individual optimal strategies, we build an explicit
solution to the transport equation (8). Hence, here, we
provide a theoretical basis for our numerical computations.
A full analysis of the mean-field game (10) requires
the computation of the equilibrium price. This price is
determined by the equilibrium condition (9). We calculate
this price using a fixed point formulation for the equilibrium
condition (see Section V).
A. Solution to the Transport Equation
Let an0 = a
n
0 and k
n
0 = k
n
0 be initial consumer goods and
capital levels for the N agents. On the macroeconomic scale,
the density of agents at the initial time t = 0 is the probability
measure
ρ0 =
1
N
N
∑
n=1
δ(an0,kn0),
where δ is the Dirac delta.
We recall that a probability measure ρ solves (8) in the
sense of distributions if for every ϕ ∈C∞c (R2×R+), we have∫ +∞
0
∫
R2
(∂tϕ+∂aϕ∂qaH +∂kϕ∂qk H)ρdkdadt = 0. (11)
Proposition 4.1: Suppose (an,kn) ∈C0([0,T ])2 solve (2)
with initial data (an0,k
n
0), respectively. Then
ρt :=
1
N
N
∑
n=1
δ(ant ,knt ) (12)
solves the transport equation (8) in the sense of distributions
and verifies∫
R2
ρt(a,k)dadk = 1, for all t ∈ [0,T ].
Proof: The proof follows by combining (12) with (11).
B. Computation of the Hamiltonian
Define qna(t) := ∂aV (ant ,knt , t) and qnk(t) := ∂kV (a
n
t ,knt , t),
where V is given by (3). As V (·, ·,T ) = 0, we have qna(T ) =
0 and qnk(T ) = 0. Set h(a,k,c, i,qa,qk, p) := (−c − pi +
F(k, p))qa + (i + g(k, p))qk + u(a,k,c, i) and assume u ∈
C1(R4).
The Hamiltonian is
H(a,k,qa,qk, p) := sup
(c,i)∈R2
h(a,k,c, i,qa,qk, p).
For the optimal c and i, we have ∂ch= 0 and ∂ih= 0. Hence{
qa = ∂cu(a,k,c∗, i∗)
qk = p∂cu(a,k,c∗, i∗)−∂iu(a,k,c∗, i∗). (13)
If u is strictly concave in c and ∂cu(a,k,c, i) = uc(c) de-
pends only on c, then uc is strictly decreasing and we can
compute c∗ = u−1c (qa). The equation for qk can be written
∂iu(a,k,c∗, i∗) = pqa− qk. As for c, if ∂iu(a,k,c, i) = ui(i)
depends only on i is strictly decreasing, then i∗ = u−1i (pqa−
qk). Consequently, we obtain
H(a,k,qa,qk, p) = h
(
a,k,u−1c (qa),u
−1
i (pqa−qk),qa,qk, p
)
.
(14)
C. Computation of the optimal trajectories
Assume V is C1. Then V solves the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation (6). Moreover, the method of characteristics gives
the Hamiltonian system [10]
a˙nt = ∂qaH(ant ,knt ,qna(t),qnk(t),pt)
k˙nt = ∂qk H(a
n
t ,knt ,qna(t),qnk(t),pt)
d
dt q
n
a(t) = −∂aH(ant ,knt ,qna(t),qnk(t),pt)
d
dt q
n
k(t) = −∂kH(ant ,knt ,qna(t),qnk(t),pt)
(15)
for the optimal trajectories of the N players. This system has
initial/terminal conditions given by
an0 = a
n
0, k
n
0 = k
n
0, q
n
a(T ) = 0, and q
n
k(T ) = 0. (16)
Reciprocally, we have the following proposition whose
proof is given in [10]:
Proposition 4.2: Assume that the utility function u ∈
C1(R4) is concave and is non-decreasing in a and k, that
the production function, F , is non-decreasing and concave
in k and that the depreciation function, g, is concave in k.
If (a,k,qa,qk) solves (15) with the initial/terminal conditions
(16), then a and k are optimal trajectories for (3) and
qa(t)≥ 0 and qk(t)≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0,T ].
Proof: See [10].
Taking into account Proposition 4.2, we aim to solve the
equation (15) with corresponding initial/terminal conditions.
Firstly, we solve (15) with initial conditions (an0,k
0
n) and
(qna(0),qnk(0)). The corresponding solution generates a func-
tion Qn : (qna(0),qnk(0)) 7→ (qna(T ),qnk(T )). Next, we deter-
mine the initial conditions (qna(0),qnk(0)) such that Q
n(q) =
0. In general, this inversion cannot be done analytically.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here, we outline our algorithm, discuss a model problem
and present the corresponding numerical results.
A. Description of the algorithm
To compute the solutions to the mean-field game, we
proceed as follows. We consider N agents with initial state
(an0,k
n
0), 1≤ n≤ N. We discretize the price function pt with
m+1 equidistant points p i
m T
, 0≤ i≤m. To recover the price
at arbitrary times t, we use a third-order interpolant.
We define qa0(a0,k0) and qk0(a0,k0) to be the values
for which the solution of (15) with the initial condition
(a0,k0,qa0(a0,k0),qk0(a0,k0)) satisfies qa(T ) = qk(T ) = 0.
This function is determined by solving numerically this
system of two equations. For a fixed price pt , we denote
(an(t),kn(t)), 1≤ n≤N to be the solution of (15) with initial
condition (an0,k
n
0,qa0(a
n
0,k
n
0),qk0(a
n
0,k
n
0)).
Next, we examine the equilibrium condition. For a given
price pt , the imbalance function is
ι(t;p) =
1
N
N
∑
n=1
[
∂qk H(a
n(t),kn(t),qna(t),q
n
k(t),pt)
−g(kn(t),pt)−Ξ(kn(t),pt)
]
.
To find p, we look at a fixed point of the function
pt 7→ pt)+µι(t,p)≡Ψ(p) (17)
for some µ > 0. Clearly, a fixed point of Ψ is an equilibrium
price. The construction of Ψ corresponds to the intuition that
when supply does not meet demand prices should increase
whereas if supply exceeds demand, prices should decrease.
When ι > 0, demand exceeds supply. Hence, prices are
too low and are increased. In contrast, if ι < 0 supply
exceeds demand. Accordingly, prices that are too high and
are decreased.
B. A model problem
To illustrate our methods, we consider a concrete example
where consumers produce consumer goods and capital at a
rate that depends linearly on the capital. We set
Θ(k, p) = k, Ξ(k, p) = 0.1k,
and so
F(k, p) = k(0.1p+1).
We assume that the depreciation function is g(k, p) = − k2 .
Next, we define
u1(x) =
{√
x+ 116 x > 0,
5
4 − (1− x)2 x≤ 0.
We note that u1 is a monotone increasing function of class
C1.
Next, we consider the utility function
u(a,k,c, i) = u1(c)+u1(a)+u1(k)− i
2
2
.
This utility function satisfies the hypothesis in Section III
and the Hamiltonian is H = HA+HB+HC, where
HA(a,k,qa,qk, p) = F(k, p)qa+g(k, p)qk +u1(a)+u1(k),
HB(a,k,qa,qk, p) = sup
i
[
(−pqa+qk)i− i
2
2
]
= (−pqa+qk)2/2,
and
HC(a,k,qa,qk, p) =−qac∗(qa)+u1(c∗(qa)),
with
c∗(qa) =
{
4−qa2
16qa2 qa > 2
2−qa
2 qa ≤ 2.
C. Numerical results
We considered 25 agents, with initial conditions equally
spaced in
[ 1
2 ,
3
2
]× [ 12 , 32]; the terminal time is T = 1, and
µ = 0.8 in (17) . Our code was implemented in Mathematica,
and we used the built-in solver NSolve.
We began with the initial p0t ≡ 1. Figure 1 depicts the
equilibrium price (achieved after 10 iterations) and Figure
2 shows the trajectories of the agents. Finally, the average
consumer goods and capital as a function of time are shown
in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. Agents to accumulate
consumer goods in the beginning and consume more in
later times, as can be seen in Figure 3. Due to the balance
condition, the average capital k¯ solves the ODE
˙¯k =−0.4k¯.
In Figure 4, we see the exact solution (dashed) superimposed
on the numerical solution. Finally, we observe in Figure 1
that the price is a monotone decreasing function of time.
Fig. 1. Price
Fig. 2. Agent’s trajectories (initial conditions in red).
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
Here, we have developed the qualitative theory, approxi-
mation methods and a novel method for the computation of
equilibrium prices in the economic growth model introduced
in [10]. Our simulations illustrate some of the qualitative
properties that we would expect such a model to satisfy.
Even so, numerous questions remain open. For instance, what
is the influence on the results of the choice of production
functions Θ and Ξ? Here, the production functions are price-
independent, but this may not be the case in a more realistic
model. Is the price a decreasing function? We expect so,
at least close to the terminal time since near T consump-
tion should take priority over investment. Can we prove
Fig. 3. Average consumer goods - a¯.
Fig. 4. Average capital - k¯ (exact solution dashed).
convergence of the numerical method? While our iterative
algorithm is based on sound economic principles, we would
like to see a mathematical proof of convergence. Finally, in
limited number of simulations the price seems to be unique.
However, this is another issue that is still open. We believe
that these are important questions that should be examined
in the future.
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